Title : Boeing Investigation Shows How It Put Profits Over Safety Of Fliers With "Optional" Safety Features
link : Boeing Investigation Shows How It Put Profits Over Safety Of Fliers With "Optional" Safety Features
Boeing Investigation Shows How It Put Profits Over Safety Of Fliers With "Optional" Safety Features
Ethiopian Air MAX 8 jet of the type that crashed with 157 on board.
"Boeing has imported the defense contractor ethic to commercial aviation. Cutting corners is a way of life. Engineering decisions are made for bureaucratic, not safety reasons. It's all good if you spread your manufacturing and political contributions around to enough congressional districts." - Comment on story in NY Times ('New Evidence In Ethiopian 737 Crash Points To Connection To Earlier Disaster')
We now are aware how spot on the above comment on Boeing's process was in terms of learning that these corporate renegades made two added safety features "optional". This as the company is being subpoenaed by the DOJ's fraud unit, including to maintain all emails, data, records, and ancillary documents to do with the approval process for the MAX 8 jet. We now know this was via "self-certification", i.e. the 'fox guarding the henhouse model', e.g.
How the FAA allows jetmakers to ‘self certify’ that planes meet U.S. safety requirements
This was in the wake of also having learned over a week ago that the Indonesian (Lion Air) pilots lost their battle with the M.C.A.S. (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) because of the MAX's faulty sensor readings. (WSJ, March 13, p. A13).
A preliminary report on the Oct. 29 Lion Air Flight 610 crash found that a device known as an “angle of attack” sensor had mistakenly indicated the plane’s nose was too high, prompting the plane’s automation software (denoted MCAS) to push the plane downward.
Boeing’s MCAS and software "fix" in conjunction with the potential for faulty sensor readings showed that the plane maker recklessly shipped the 737 Max with a single point of failure, a potentially dangerous anomaly in aviation. What that means is a single error or oversight - or failure to quickly respond - could bring catastrophe if the anti-stall system kicked in and pointed the plane's nose down.
But instead of making two safety features (" and extra angle of attack sensor) available as standard pdisagree" sensorarts of the plane, Boeing only provided them if purchased as "optional upgrades". The first one would warn pilots if the anti-stall (MCAS) system could activate unnecessarily, the other provided a separate reading for the angle of attack - i.e. to confirm the first.) Either or both of these present in the Lion Air 610 or Ethiopian Air 302 flights could have averted the respective catastrophes. This now that aviation specialists believe the anti-stall systems kicked in repeatedly triggering nose dives in each plane.
Despite that, one nincompoop former FAA Director of Accident Investigations (Jeff Gazetti), quoted this a.m. (CBS This Morning), asserted that whether or not the Lion Air pilots had access to the safety features they should have been trained to handle the issue. As the ignorant twerp spouted:
"It's the culture of this airline, it seems, in not aggressively handling the maintenance issues as well as in flight non -normal situations."
Right! Blame it on the culture of the victims or failure to act instantly in an emergency, you lackey! But as one pilot quoted on an NBS News segment last week put it, "I don't know that I'd remember to hit those TRIM switches (together - there are 2 side by side) in an emergency" and one former Southwest made it even more plain before this former FAA lackey's codswallop:
"The fact that this airplane requires such jury rigging to fly is a red flag."
Besides, dozens of U.S. Pilots complained of inadequate training on the MCAS planes, unfamiliarity with the controls, and anxiety that prompted them to engage the autopilot earlier than normal. In at least two instances the plane pitched downward or maneuvered against pilots’ inputs. Much of this was elaborated on in over a week ago, e.g.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yUidpjr8Xzw
Besides, the knock on the Lion Air crew that they ought to have disengaged the MCAS is also irrelevant, given Boeing already admitted its flight manual was incomplete. It didn't have all the information needed to do this or even let pilots know where the disconnect knob was located. As one furious pilot put it: "That part of the plane’s flight system is not described in our Flight Manual" adding, "It's inadequate and almost criminally insufficient.
We now know the disagree sensor with its blinking red light has been an available feature on Boeing planes since the 1990s. But there was little need for it before the advent of the redesign of the Boeing 737. To remind readers, Boeing chose to retain an older airframe and 'marry' it to a newer, marginally more fuel efficient engine. That ploy - uniting old plus new- was part of Boeing’s pitch to the F.A.A. and airlines: Because the plane's basic design was retained it could be handled like previous 737s, so pilots would not need to be retrained to fly it.
But the Boeing engineers then had to figure out a way to make the odd match fit properly. So the engines were placed more forward on the wing, altering the aircraft's lift characteristics, and placing more stress (at takeoff) on the horizontal stabilizers - oh and the jackscrews to control them. This in turn led to the need for the introduction of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System and its anti-stall triggering.
Bottom line, had the plane not been aerodynamically altered, the MCAS interjection wouldn't have been needed. As aviation journalist Chris Van Kleef explained on a CBS segment this morning:
"What changed was the importance of these sensors and their link to this anti-stall system which is brand new to the MAX. In hindsight, Boeing failed to appreciate the importance of those angle of attack sensors, and that both be linked to the anti-stall system, and that the pilots have a clear understanding of what's going on with those two sensors. Those features went from optional to really important."
Bingo! But now, in retrospect, we see that 346 had to pay for their lives before Boeing grasped its crass optional safety features model. Let us hope before this is all over, Boeing's geniuses also grasp it's not a great idea to charge more for planes to have a backup fire extinguisher for the cargo hold!
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